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Defendan1 ya%bM~ liit'd~~~;~"to Plaintiff Avi Datner's First Amended Complaint 
("FAC"), and sep lrately moves to strike portions thereof. The court has read and considered the 
moving, oppositic'n and reply papers, and renders the following tentative decision. 
A. Staterr ent ofthe Case 
Plaintiff jJ vi Datner commenced this lawsuit on July 11, 2006. After a demurrer, 
Plaintiff filed his FAC on October 23, 2006. 
The FAC llleges that Plaintiff is in the business of selling advertising to companies 
which perform se :vices for parties, weddings, and other events. The primary means of 
Plaintiff advertisi 19 his business is through his website, Party pop.com. Plaintiff learned in 2005 
that his website d.d not appear in a search results for wedding or party services through 
Defendant's seanh engine. In contrast, the same search through AOL, MSN, and Google 
revealed his web; ite. Plaintiff notified Defendant of this result and, for a short time, his website 
did appear in seal ches through Defendant. That is no longer true. 
The F AC llleges causes of action for intentional interference with prospective economic 
advantage, "negJi gent interference with prospective economic advantage,"l and violation ofB&P 
section 17200. 
B. Applicable Law 
Where pic adings are defective, a party may raise the defect by way of a demurrer or 
motion to strike (r by motion for judgment on the pleadings. CCP §430JO(a); Coyne v. 
Krempels, (1950: 36 Cal.2d 257. The party against whom a complaint or cross·complaint has 
been filed may object by demurrer or answer to the pleading. CCP §430.10. A demurrer is 
timely filed withi 11 the 30-day period after service of the complaint. CCP § 430.40; Skrbina v. 
Fleming Companies, (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1364. 
A demurr:r may be asserted on anyone or more of the following grounds: (a) The court 
has no jurisdictio 1 of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading; (b) The person 
who filed the pie: lding does not have legal capacity to sue; (c) There is another action pending 
between the SaJllC· parties on the SaJlle cause of action; (d) There is a defect or misjoinder of 
parties; (e) The peading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; (f) The 
pleading is uncerain ("uncertain" includes ambiguous and unintelligible); (g) In an action 
rdpnded upon a C Jntract, it cannot be ascertained from the pleading whether the contract is 
written, is oral, 0 . is implied by conduct; (h) No certificate was filed as required by CCP §411J 5 
orl(i) by §411.36 CCP §430.10. Accordingly, a demurrer tests the sufficiency of a pleading, and 
th'i; grounds for a demurrer must appear on the face ofthe pleading or from judicially noticeable 
';.'/ 
n'ljitters. CCP §430JO(a); Blank v. Kirwan, (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318. 
INo such ~ause of action exists in California. 
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The sole ssue on demurrer for failure to state a cause of action is whether the facts 
pleaded, if true, ,vould entitle the plaintiff to relief. Garcetti v. Superior Court, (J 996) 49 
Cal.App.4th 1531, 1547; Limandri v. Judkins, (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326,339. The question of 
plaintiff s ability to prove the allegations of the complaint or the possible difficulty in making 
such proof does 1 lOt concern the reviewing court. Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., 
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 47. The ultimate facts alleged in the complaint must be deemed true, as 
well as all facts t lat may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged. Marshall v. 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1397,1403. Nevertheless, this rule does not 
apply to allegatic ns expressing mere conclusions of law, or allegations contradicted by the 
exhibits to the complaint or by matters of which judicial notice may be taken. Vance v. Villa 
Park Mobilehom: Estates, (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 698,709. 
C. AnaJy.is 
The FAC's first cause of action for intentional interference with prospective economic 
advantage. To stlte this cause of action, Plaintiff must allege: (1) the existence of a specifically-
identifiable economic relationship that had the probability of future economic benefit; (2) the 
defendant's knov'ledge of that relationship; (3) intentional, wrongful conduct designed to disrupt 
the relationship; ,4) actual disruption of that relationship; and (5) damages. Korea Supply Co. v. 
Lochkeed Martini&m, (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1153-1154. The alleged act of interference 
must itself be wrongful by some legal measure other than the fact of interference itself. Id.; see 
also, Della Penn<, v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., (1995) 11 Cal.4th 376, 393. 
The FAC alleges none of these elements. Plaintiff fails to identify a single economic 
relationship with which Defendant interfered, let alone Defendant's knowledge ofthe 
unidentified ecor omic relationships, conduct designed to disrupt the relationship, or damages. 
Plaintiff has also not alleged any conduct by Defendant wrongful by some legal measure separate 
from the interfen nce. 
Nor coule he. Defendant has no legal duty to include his business in its search results. 
Plaintiff does nol allege that he had any contractual relationship with Defendant, nor does he 
identifY any law 'lVhich would require Defendant to include his business in its search engine. 
Defendant is not 1 telephone company regulated by a public utilities commission and bound to 
include all adven ising businesses in its telephone book. Defendant is free to include or exclude 
any company it v'ants from its search results. Defendant's failure to list Plaintiffs business is 
simply not a wro 19ful act. 
Furthermore, Yahoo! has a First Amendment right to include or exclude whatever it 
wants in its searc 1 engine results. Cj Blalty v. N.Y. Times Co., (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1033, 1048-
1049 (New York Times can exclude any book it wishes from its "Best Sellers" list); Jefferson 
County v. Mood,'s Investor Services, Inc., (10 th Cir. 1999) 175 F.3d 848. 
;l. The deml ITer to the first cause of action is sustained without leave to amend. 
'") 
., The secord cause of action fails for the simple reason that there is no such thing as 
rlJ'gligent interfer ence with prospective economic advantage. As discussed above, claims for 
. , 
i~)erference with prospective economic advantage require pleading and proof of some 
itlj:entional, wron ~ful conduct because the act of interference itself is simply not wrongful. By 
9~fInition, intenti onal conduct is not negligent. If a defendant breaches some other duty of care, 
" .~. 
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then the cause of lcction is simply negligence. Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant breached 
any duty of care. 
The third cause of action for violation ofB&P section 17200 fails for numerous reasons. 
First, Plaintiff pur ports to represent the general public. Following the passage of Proposition 64 
in November 200·1, he may not do so except in a class action. 
Second, e"en as a personal action, as noted above Defendant owes no duty to include 
Plaintiffs websit( in its search results. Therefore, the failure to include it is simply not 
actionable, as the conduct is not wrongful. 
Plaintiff a iserts that Defendant "expressly and impliedly represents to the general public 
that search result; conducted on its website are fair, accurate and based on unbiased 
mathematical algorithms designed to give the public true search results based on the words used 
in the search." Plaintiffpoints to no such representations anywhere on Defendant's site.' Even if 
they exist, the ab; ence of Plaintiff s business from search results is not in any way unfair or 
inaccurate. Not all search engines work in the same marmer. The identical search conducted on 
two different eng nes will not provide identical results. If that were the case, there would be no 
reflson to use one search engine over another. 
The demurrer is sustained in its entirety without leave to amend. An OSC re: dismissal is 
set for January 5, 2007.3 
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;'j 'The cou t is dubious whether there is any such thing as an "implied representation." 
l" fjther a represer tation is made expressly, or it is not made at all. 
i 3The mol ion to strike is placed off calendar as moot. 
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